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Abstract 
In this paper I attempt to reconstruct David Hume’s use of  the label ‘experimental’ to 
characterise his method in the Treatise. Although its meaning may strike the present-day reader as 
unusual, such a reconstruction is possible from the background of  eighteenth-century practices 
and concepts of  natural inquiry. As I argue, Hume’s inquiries into human nature are experimental 
not primarily because of  the way the empirical data he uses are produced, but because of  the way 
those data are theoretically processed. He seems to follow a method of  analysis and synthesis 
quite similar to the one advertised in Newton’s Opticks, which profoundly influenced eighteenth-
century natural and moral philosophy. This method brings him much closer to the methods of  
qualitative, chemical investigations than to mechanical approaches to both nature and human 
nature. 
 
Hume’s Experimental Method 3 
I. Introduction 
The adjective ‘experimental’ with which Hume characterises his method in the subtitle of  his 
Treatise of  Human Nature is far from being unequivocal. According to a widespread interpretation 
it refers formally to Newton, and it indicates nothing more than that Hume, like many of  his 
contemporaries, aspired to be as significant for the moral sciences as Newton was for natural 
philosophy.1 It is also frequently suggested that the label ‘experimental’ simply declares Hume’s 
empiricism, and does not imply anything beyond ‘experiential’: it suggests a method that takes 
private experience as its starting point and argues from there –2 as opposed to starting from a 
priori insights and proceeding in a rationalistic guise. Accepting either of  these interpretations, 
one could go even further and conclude that Hume’s commitment to an ‘experimental method’ is 
nothing more than a marketing trick played in order to secure a respectable position for his work 
in an intellectual climate dominated by Newtonians on the one hand, and a ‘culture of  fact’ on 
the other.3 
 Accepting these interpretations, however, makes it impossible to account for some eighteenth-
century evaluations of  Hume’s enterprise, which regard him as being the only one who ever 
applied the experimental method with any success in this field.4 And it is also impossible to give a 
charitable reading of  what his subtitle, ‘An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of  
Reasoning into Moral Subjects’, could mean. Some who take Hume and his experimental method 
more literally emphasized parallels with Newton while others have argued that his intellectual 
debts should be paid to Boyle instead.5 Others believe that his work is most properly placed 
within a tradition that applies the Baconian methods of  natural history in moral inquiry, a 
tradition that had begun with Locke and flourished in Scotland at that time.6 Recently it has also 
been suggested that Hume, in a similar vein to Buffon, adopts a critical stance towards the 
mechanical and mathematical foundations of  experimental natural philosophy as it was envisaged 
in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.7 
 As Hume nowhere gives a sufficiently detailed summary of  his method, it takes some effort to 
find out what epistemic ideals he had in mind while developing his theory of  human nature. In 
this paper I intend to reconstruct what ‘experimental’ might mean to Hume with an attention to 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of  Economics (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2005) 80. 
2 See e.g. Gary Hatfield, ‘Remaking the Science of  Mind: Psychology as Natural Science’, in Inventing Human Science, 
edited by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1995) 208.  
3 Reinhard Brandt, ‘Philosophical Methods’, in The Cambridge History of  Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Knud 
Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 143. 
4 David Allan, Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993) 154. 
5 See Michael Barfoot, ‘Hume and the Culture of  Science’, in Studies in the Philosophy of  Scottish Enlightenment, edited by 
M.A. Stewart. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Eugene Sapadin, ‘A Note on Newton, Boyle, and Hume’s 
‘Experimental Method’’, Hume Studies 23 (1997): 337-344. 
6 See Paul Wood, ‘The Natural History of  Man in the Scottish Enlightenment’, History of  Science 28 (1990): 89-123. 
7 Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of  California Press 2005) 37f. 
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the context of  eighteenth-century experimental philosophy. I will do so with a double focus 
following then common Baconian division of  knowledge,8 which presumed a distinction between 
historical and philosophical modes of  inquiry. History, both civil and natural, was a descriptive 
and classificatory enterprise relying on observation and experimentation. The descriptions 
historical inquiry produced were considered to be the raw material of  philosophical inquiry into 
the principles and causes of  phenomena for the purposes of  explanation. Searching for 
underlying causes is a preoccupation of  natural as well as of  moral philosophy, where the latter 
investigates phenomena relating to moral beings, and not exclusively morality. And while these two 
kinds of  inquiry started to merge in the eighteenth century,9 it will serve as a good guide to 
understanding Hume’s method. 
 In this paper I intend to reconstruct what the label ‘experimental’ could mean in the context 
of  the Treatise. Although its meaning may strike the present-day reader as unusual, such a 
reconstruction is possible from the background of  eighteenth-century practices and concepts of  
natural inquiry. As I shall argue here, Hume’s inquiries into human nature are experimental not 
primarily because of  the way he produced empirical data, but because of  the way those data are 
theoretically processed. He seems to follow a method of  analysis and synthesis quite similar to 
the one advertised in Newton’s Opticks, which profoundly influenced eighteenth-century natural 
and moral philosophy. This method brings him much closer to the methods of  qualitative, 
chemical investigations than to mechanical approaches to both nature and human nature. 
 
II. The Historical Pillar of  Hume’s Method 
The empirical raw material from which Hume constructs a theory of  human nature is descriptive 
and historical in character. Already in the Introduction of  the Treatise he suggests we should 
‘glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of  human life’ (THN 
Introduction.10),10 which seems analogous with natural historical observation and description 
transposed into the sphere of  moral phenomena. This third-person, observer account of  human life is 
Hume’s main methodological pillar. It is most clearly manifested in several passages of  Book 2, 
discussing passions, in which he frequently refers to the common course of  behaviour, typically 
in three contexts: either as a resource of  phenomena to be accounted for in terms of  the 
                                                 
8 For a diagrammatic overview see Sachiko Kusukawa, ‘Bacon’s Classification of  Knowledge’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Bacon, edited by Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) 69. 
9 See John Gascoigne, ‘The Study of  Nature’, in The Cambridge History of  Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Knud 
Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) 863f. 
10 David Hume’s works are quoted from the Clarendon Edition: Treatise of  Human Nature (THN), edited by David 
Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), following the form: book.part.section.paragraph. 
His Enquiries concerning Human Understanding (EHU), edited by Tom Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); 
Enquiries concerning the Principles of  Morals (EPM), edited by Tom Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) are 
quoted as: section.paragraph. 
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principles of  human nature, or as a stock of  confirming evidence supporting his explanatory 
constructs, or as seemingly contrary evidences to be explained away. 
 One should also add, that for Hume observation is not only a method of  detached, third-
person inquiry, but it also belongs to the second-person, participant perspective as is manifested in how 
we interact with one another. Observation is also the way in which we learn the regularities 
characteristic to human behaviour in general; it belongs to the course of  common practice as well 
as to the proper foundation of  philosophical reasoning (see THN 2.3.1.15; EHU 8.18). 
Observation of  human life is thus the point where inquiry and common life turn out to be 
continuous, the only difference being that the former is reflective, systematic and theory-oriented 
whereas the other is unreflective, sporadic and practice-oriented. This continuity is clearly 
illustrated when Hume (THN 3.2.9.4) discusses the nature of  political obligation: he supports his 
philosophical account with examples of  the behaviour of  common people who act based on the 
principles Hume discusses even if  they cannot articulate them. 
 Should Hume’s method of  studying human nature rely on observation only, it would be hard 
to see, how it could deserve the label ‘experimental’ – if  it is to entail anything more than 
‘experiential’. And indeed, the historical foundations of  his method comprise two further 
empirical sources that may clarify the meaning of  ‘experimental’ here. The first is human history: 
Its chief  use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of  human nature, by 
showing men in all varieties of  circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials 
from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of  
human action and behaviour. These records of  wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so 
many collections of  experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the 
principles of  his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes 
acquainted with the nature of  plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments 
which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by 
Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observation than 
the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world. (EHU 
8.7) 
 
There are two interesting points to note about this passage in the present context. First, it treats 
historiography as providing data methodologically analogous with experiment in an important 
way: both would present its objects in various situations and furnish us with empirical material on 
which to theorise. If  our focus is on human nature, then it is history that provides us with the 
variation of  circumstances in which the causal contribution of  its ingredients can be identified 
and studied. 
 Secondly, history establishes theoretical conclusions in very much the same way as natural 
history, meaning that moral and natural philosophies are methodologically continuous. In the 
light of  the above passage it is easy to conceive of  historians as reporting experiments made on 
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human nature – and while there may be no experimenter, there are reported events that can be 
treated as experiments. Therefore, ‘experiment’ in this context may well be metaphorical, but 
what really matters is that historical records are methodological equivalents of  detailed experimental 
histories. Methodologically speaking, a moral philosopher can use historical works in very much 
the same way as a natural philosopher can rely on experimental histories produced by others. 
Newton, for example, selected from among Boyle’s and Hooke’s experimental findings to 
juxtapose them with available optical theories so as to gain new insights while working on his 
own theory of  light. This is, as Kuhn says, ‘a non-Baconian use of  Baconian experiment’:11 it 
proceeds not inductively but by contrasting empirical material with existing theories. But it is also 
a practice quite consistent with the use of  history Hume proposes in the study of  human nature, 
both in its use of  second-hand experience and in its juxtaposition of  experience with existing 
theories. What thus becomes crucial in each case is to identify the relevant and reliable parts of  
histories. This poses a common problem, again, to both moral and natural philosophies, one not 
to be discussed here, namely the role of  testimony in cognition.12 
 As history ‘extends our experience to all past ages, and to the most distant nation; making 
them contribute as much to our improvement in wisdom, as if  they had actually lain under our 
observation’ it adds to the pool of  first-hand observations on human life so that ‘[a] man 
acquainted with history may, in some respect, be said to have lived from the beginning of  the 
world, and to have been making continual additions to his stock of  knowledge in every 
country’.13 Although history is thus continuous with direct observation, it still surpasses the 
philosophical importance of  observing particular cases, because it offers richer and more 
conclusive empirical material for philosophical reasoning. As Hume sees it, history allows for 
observing how some general transformation in the circumstances would exert influence on the 
thinking and behaviour of  entire populations, and this is what makes politics as a science 
possible. By reporting large-scale transformations historiography presents several cases of  a cause 
followed by an effect, and thus it provides a much broader and more effective basis for inductive 
generalisations than everyday experience or the observation of  particular instances. The latter 
ones are much more likely to deviate from general regularities due to the influence of  
idiosyncratic circumstances,14 and they are thus less reliable sources for inferring the principles of  
                                                 
11 Thomas Kuhn, ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of  Physical Science’, in The 
Essential Tension (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press 1976) 50. 
12 Wheras I do not have the space to discuss this problem here, Hume certainly does it in the EHU’s chapter ‘Of  
Miracles’. 
13 David Hume, ‘Of  the Study of  History’, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, vol. 2., edited by T.H. Green and 
T.H. Grose (London 1882) 390. 
14 David Hume, ‘Of  the Rise and Progress of  the Arts and Sciences’, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, vol. 1., 
edited by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London 1882) 175ff. 
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human nature. 
 There are, however, important and obvious dissimilarities between historical events and 
experiments. As Hume sees clearly, it is impossible in the field of  moral philosophy to conduct 
experiments ‘purposely, with premeditation’ (THN Introduction.10). Since the seventeenth 
century, ‘experimental’ partly meant, as Kuhn has Bacon say, ‘twisting the lion’s tail’, ‘torturing’ 
nature,15 i.e. producing situations that would not exist in nature without human intervention, that 
is, it increasingly meant an artificial step in knowledge production. As Hume indicates, this kind 
of  experiment, i.e. contrived experience, has only limited availability in the science of  man. Social 
experiments, comparable to those of  historical events, are impracticable, and one could also 
argue that the relevant experiments would distort the principles of  human nature as does 
introspection (THN Introduction.10; EHU 1.13). And this indicates a limitation on an 
experimental science of  human nature. Without contrived experience asking specific questions 
about the reliability of  a theory of  human nature is hardly possible. 
 One might think that denying the possibility of  manipulative intervention with the hope of  
cognitive benefit is devastating for Hume’s attempt at finding a proper experimental footing for 
his project, so ‘experimental’ for Hume ‘meant no more and no less than an appeal to experience 
in support of  his claims’.16 As contrived experiments cannot play a role, it is impossible to design 
a Newtonian experimentum crucis to test alternative propositions as well as to follow the Boylean 
way of  experimental fact-collecting for the purposes of  subsequent philosophical processing. 
What seems to remain is only a very general and unspecific sense of  ‘experimental’ meaning 
something akin to Baconian natural, but not experimental, history: i.e. fact-collecting and 
systematic observation.  
 But, pace Wood,17 this Baconian stance does not inform Hume’s actual practice. At the time of  
writing the Treatise, i.e. much before he devoted himself  to writing his history of  England, he had 
had substantial knowledge of  history,18 yet he never proceeds by listing ‘experiments’, taken from 
history or contemporary observation, in order to infer on this basis inductively his theoretical 
insights – something one would expect from a faithful Baconian. Instead, he is using both history 
and observation as sources of  experimenta crucis: showing the explanatory strength and plausibility 
of  his theory by comparing and contrasting phenomena to assess the truth or falsehood of  
alternative explanations. An explicit example is his discussion of  why love is always followed by 
benevolence and hatred by anger when he contrasts two possible hypotheses and decides 
                                                 
15 Kuhn, op. cit., 44. 
16 Hatfield, op. cit. 208. 
17 Wood, op. cit. 98f. 
18 Roger L. Emerson, ‘Hume’s Intellectual Developmen: Part II’, in Essays on David Hume, Medical Men and the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009). 
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between them on the basis of  observation (THN 2.2.6.3f). Instead of  accumulating several 
examples Hume carefully chooses cases he considers crucial in a given context and highlights 
features that make them especially relevant in his account. It is thus not the way in which 
empirical material for theory building is gained, but the methodological role it plays that makes this 
material experimental. 
 There is another possible source of  ‘experiments’ which Hume does not make use of. Travel 
writing was already important for Locke’s historical explorations of  human understanding,19 and in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this genre was generally conceived as a rich collection 
of  ‘human experiments’. At the end of  the period Edmund Burke sees its importance so great 
that for him it replaces history in the science of  man because it can reveal ‘the great map of  
mankind’.20 One could thus wonder why Hume does not ascribe to it a weight at least similar to 
that of  history. One reason is given in an essay where he argues that the differences among 
various nations are to be explained exclusively by moral causes,21 i.e. in terms of  the customs, 
institutions, morality and system of  rules etc. prevailing in a given group, and denies, pace 
Montesquieu, that physical causes like climate, available food, etc. could influence these. Another 
reason may be that travel writing can grasp neither the development of  moral causes 
diachronically, nor distinguish what reflects human nature versus local custom. The interaction of  
moral causes can be revealed only diachronically, so travel writing is practically useless as it offers 
a description of  the present state of  affairs, not the process by which it has emerged. Therefore 
its capacity to serve as an experimental basis for philosophical inquiry is even more limited than 
that of  history. 
 
III. The Philosophical Pillar of  Hume’s Method 
In the modern sense, as we have just seen, the prospects of  providing an experimental basis for 
Hume’s science of  man is fairly limited, as ‘experiments’ here cannot arise from an intervention 
into the normal course of  human nature, which would render the findings useless anyway. 
However, Hume is much less concerned with how empirical material is to be gained than with 
how it is to be processed. It is thus not primarily the meaning of  ‘experimental’ that should be 
clarified in its own right, but rather the entire phrase, experimental method of  reasoning, as it reads in 
the subtitle of  the Treatise. 
                                                 
19 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975) 
1.2.9. 
20 Peter J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map of  Mankind: Perceptions of  the New Worlds in the Age of  
Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1982) 93. 
21 David Hume, ‘Of  National Characters’, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, vol 1., edited by T.H. Green and T.H. 
Grose (London 1882) 246ff. 
Hume’s Experimental Method 9 
 It is quite clear from some of  Hume’s passages that his method is intended to be contrasted 
with a priori and geometrical methods – for example, the one which Hobbes (1845, 184) had 
found appropriate for his civil philosophy,22 or Descartes’s method of  searching for clear and 
distinct principles in order to construct theories in an intuitive and deductive way.23 In the light of  
the subject’s nature Hume finds this kind of  method wanting in comparison with an 
experimental approach: 
we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims 
from a comparison of  particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general abstract 
principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of  inferences and 
conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of  human nature, and is 
a common source of  illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. (EPM 1.10) 
 
For Hume (e.g. EHU 4.10ff), a demonstrative ideal of  inquiry, which proceeds in an a priori 
manner from allegedly clear definitions or indubitable propositions, is of  no use if  one is in the 
business of  an empirically founded science of  man. It can be useful only in constructing 
explanations once we have knowledge of  the principles of  human nature, but such knowledge 
can be gained only from experience, and not in an a priori way. 
 Hume’s attitude is consonant with the rejection of  ‘speculative’ in favour of  ‘experimental 
philosophy’ which, as Thomas Sprat explains while writing the history of  the Royal Society, was 
the innovation setting the new philosophy apart from previous approaches to nature.24 This is 
how Newton, in a draft of  a letter to Cotes, discriminates his position from alternative strategies 
in natural philosophy: 
Experimental philosophy reduces phenomena to general rules and looks upon the rules to be 
general when they hold generally in phenomena. … Hypothetical philosophy consists in 
imaginary explications of things and imaginary arguments for or against such explications, or 
against the arguments of experimental philosophers founded upon induction. The first sort of 
philosophy is followed by me, the latter too much by Descartes, Leibniz, and some others.25 
 
And it is indeed the perception of  the inferiority of  speculative approaches that motivates Hume 
in undertaking the enterprise of  founding moral philosophy on an experimental basis. The 
broadest outlines of  his methodological intentions are made clear in an early letter of  March 
1734:  
I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labour’d much under the 
same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of  being entirely 
                                                 
22 See Thomas Hobbes, ‘Six Lessons to the Savilian Professors of  the Mathematics’, in The English Works of  Thomas 
Hobbes of  Malmesbury, vol. 7, edited by William Molesworth. (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans 1845) 
184. 
23 See Daniel Garber, ‘Descartes and Method in 1637’, in Descartes Embodied (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000) 37. 
24 Thomas Sprat, History of  the Royal Society (London 1667) 341. 
25 See Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings, edited by Andrew Janiak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004) 
120f. 
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Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience. Every one consulted his 
Fancy in erecting Schemes of  Virtue & of  Happiness, without regarding human Nature, upon 
which every moral Conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved to make my principal 
Study, & the Source from which I wou’d derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality.26 
 
 For Hume the experimental method of  reasoning aims at revealing the underlying causes of  
phenomena to explain the regularities of  both nature and human nature in terms of  principles 
knowable from a human point of  view. And the project is to reveal from observable phenomena 
these explanatory principles that are themselves not observable, and to resolve them into more 
and more general ones: 
‘tis at least worth while to try if  the science of  man will not admit of  the same accuracy which 
several parts of  natural philosophy are found susceptible of. There seems to be all reason in 
the world to imagine that it may be carried to the greatest degree of  exactness. If, in 
examining several phænomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one common 
principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at last arrive at those few 
principles, on which all the rest depend. And tho’ we can never arrive at the ultimate 
principles, ‘tis a satisfaction to go as far as our faculties will allow us. (THN Abstract.1) 
 
So while the inquiry may not result in knowledge of  some human essence, it can satisfy our 
curiosity and it can be useful as well. The science of  man, like any other science ‘is to teach us, 
how to control and regulate future events by their causes,’ (EHU 7.29) so that we can apply this 
knowledge in the interest of  society (see EHU 1.9). This knowledge is thus both instrumental and 
subjectively satisfactory, but it is not knowledge of  the ultimate first principles of  human nature. 
 ‘All the logic’ (THN 1.3.15.11) he follows in this inquiry is summarised as a set of  rules to 
regulate the explorations of  causes, rules that are equally uniform for both natural and moral 
philosophy. These rules are applied in both fields 
to reduce the principles, productive of  natural phænomena, to a greater simplicity, and to 
resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of  reasonings from 
analogy, experience, and observation. (EHU 4.12) 
 
Finding analogies between different instances gives the chance of  explaining causes and reducing 
them to ‘more general principles’ (THN Appendix.3). Hume also clarifies how to use the 
experimental basis in analogical reasoning so as to arrive at the principles of  human nature and 
the explanation of  human phenomena. The method here is a kind of  analysis and synthesis: 
By means of  this guide [i.e. historical and everyday observations of  human behaviour], we 
mount up to the knowledge of  men’s inclinations and motives, from their actions, 
expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of  their actions from 
our knowledge of  their motives and inclinations. The general observations treasured up by a 
course of  experience, give us the clue of  human nature, and teach us to unravel all its 
intricacies. (EHU 8.9) 
 
                                                 
26 Letters of  David Hume, vol. 1, edited by J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1932) 16. 
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Although the exact terms of  analysis and synthesis do not figure here, the terms ‘mounting up’ 
and ‘descending’ belong to the same ballpark of  concepts as analysis and synthesis, and they are 
applied especially in the context of  searching for causes.27 
This method of  exploring the understanding by the ‘exact analysis of  its powers and capacity’ 
(EHU 1.12) is not an exclusively philosophical method: it is continuous with the everyday way of  
finding out what is on someone else’s mind. 
When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately 
passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is 
presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any 
emotion, my mind is convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion. ... No 
passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes 
or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy. 
(THN 3.3.1.7) 
 
The difference between philosophical inquiry and everyday ‘mind reading’ is that in the latter case 
we infer the contents of  the other’s mind, while in the former we aim at revealing the general 
causal principles underlying these phenomena. While doing philosophy we just give up the 
participant’s position for the observer’s, and start searching for regularities instead of  occurent 
mental states, but our methods of  so doing are similar in both cases. 
 Overlooking the centrality of  this descending and ascending method in Hume can lead to the 
unjust allegation that there is a general instability in his thought resulting from the unclear 
relation between the science of  man and history: the principles of  the former sometimes seem to 
follow from historical observations, sometimes they serve as the explanation of  historical 
events.28 This is, however, not due to any intrinsic instability in Hume’s thought, but results from 
the methodological status of  the principles themselves. We gain them from phenomena in the 
phase of  analysis by comparative means, but in the phase of  synthesis we use them for the 
purposes of  explanation. The perspective reverses itself  in the two phases: in the first it turns 
from phenomena to principles, in the second from principles to phenomena. The epistemic aims 
are thus different: by analysis we aim at lawlike principles, by synthesis we aim at the explanation of  
phenomena by deriving them from these principles. 
 The methodological core idea is now visible. Human phenomena are collected from history 
and observation, and then compared; if  analogies and similarities are found, they are ascribed to 
some principles of  human nature that are also compared, grouped and resolved into more 
general ones. Once phenomena are analysed into their causal springs, the resulting principles can 
be construed for the purposes of  explanation thereby satisfying our curiosity and facilitating the 
                                                 
27 See Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon and the Art of  Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1974) 249f. 
28 See Leon Pompa, Human Nature and Historical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1990) 21 and 36f. 
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improvement of  society – without the possibility of  ultimate knowledge of  human essence. As 
the principles Hume looks for lay behind observable phenomena, there is inevitably a degree of  
uncertainty and fallibility in the results that this inquiry may deliver: 
we must distinguish exactly betwixt the phænomenon itself, and the causes, which I shall 
assign for it; and must not imagine from any uncertainty in the latter, that the former is also 
uncertain. The phænomenon may be real, tho’ my explication be chimerical. The falsehood of  
the one is no consequence of  that of  the other. (THN 1.2.5.19) 
 
 Due to this fallibility, the ingredients of  human nature can be supposed to be fundamentally 
uniform only in a methodological and fallible, as opposed to some essentialist, sense – just like 
the fundamental elements of  the world are supposed to be unchanged in our natural inquires (see 
EHU 8.7, quoted above). This is a conviction Hume expresses in the quote above on the 
methodological role of  history, and he also says it quite straightforwardly elsewhere: 
nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never 
remark any passion or principle in others, of  which, in some degree or other, we may not find 
a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of  the mind, as with that of  the 
body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in 
general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself  amidst all 
their variety. (THN 2.1.11.5) 
 
This commitment to the structural uniformity of  human nature arises from his rules 4 and 5 (THN 
1.3.15.6f), which claim that the same effect must be traced back to some similarity in their causes, 
a conviction which is retained in the study of  human nature, too: ‘human nature remains still the 
same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The 
same events follow from the same causes.’29 (EHU 8.7) 
 This commitment ensures that it is sensible to look for the components of  this fundamental 
structure or regularity in human nature, a commitment similar to that of  the natural philosopher. 
This is thus a methodological sine qua non for exploring the natural historical category of  a moral 
being, and not, pace Roger Smith,30 an a priori category of  a universal human nature in the 
substantive sense of  a human essence. What Hume’s project presupposes is not that human 
beings are the same sans phrase, only that there is a descriptive, natural historical category, based 
on the similarities of  its members which are constituted by qualitatively similar ingredients 
accessible by comparative methods. And this is what specifies the cognitive benefit to be 
expected from Hume’s science of  man: the ‘delineation of  the distinct parts and powers of  the 
mind’ (EHU 1.13). 
 Methodologically speaking this is a commitment to processing empirical material on the 
                                                 
29 Hume in these passages seems to echo Newton’s ‘Rules for the Study of  Natural Philosophy’ in Newton, op. cit., 
87ff. 
30 Roger Smith, ‘The Language of  Human Nature’, in Inventing Human Science, edited by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter 
and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1995) 89. 
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assumption of  structural uniformity, with an attention to the causal contribution of  structural 
elements, or in other words: identifying the functional ingredients of  human nature and their 
characteristic role in producing human action and internal functioning. This inquiry yields the 
principles of  human nature to be relied on in the explanations of  moral philosophy, and 
therefore these structurally fundamental principles of  human nature are the proper aim of  
inquiry in the science of  man. Even though on the most widespread interpretation ‘Hume 
rejected faculty psychology ... and saw the mind instead as a single chain of  basic impressions and 
ideas’,31 these principles are indeed subsumed under specific faculties like reason, imagination, 
sympathy, etc. whose interaction explains why our impressions and ideas follow one another in 
the chain in the order they do. 
 There are other less stable principles playing an important role here: 
I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible 
and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to 
causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; ... The former are the 
foundation of  all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin. (THN 1.4.4.1) 
 
Some principles of  imagination are then constitutive of  human nature, but some others are just 
contingent on culture, history or can even be idiosyncrasies, and can end up in superstitions or 
philosophical chimeras like presupposing ‘substance’ as the bearer of  properties in scholastic 
metaphysics. So while the universal principles provide the general framework, on their basis 
various circumstances inculcate particular ones. This explains why certain virtues, like e.g. 
courage, are evaluated differently in different historical periods (EPM 7.11ff), and also why a 
human-like creature without sympathy, however contingent its degree and direction may be, 
would count as a ‘monster’ not a ‘man’ (EPM 6.1f). It is thus apt to say that while the framework 
is universal, its content is to a high degree contingent. This amounts to saying that Hume’s 
account has both universalistic and particularistic elements in it, and it sheds a sharp light on the 
methodological role history plays: it is only from a diachronic perspective, through the study of  
change, that universal and contingent features of  human nature can be separated. 
 
IV. Hume’s Newtonianism 
The question of  Hume’s Newtonianism has tormented Hume scholars for several decades.32 
There are some respects, indeed, in which Hume’s method can be compared to that of  Newton’s 
                                                 
31 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of  a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2003) 107. 
32 For an overview of  the problem see Eric Schliesser, ‘Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism’, in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/hume-newton/. 
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Principia [1687]. Among these one can mention the rules we have just seen in Hume, i.e. same 
effect – same cause and vice versa, which figures among those Newton puts forward in the second 
and third editions of  the Principia.33 This seems to be a rule of  inference they both follow in their 
explorations of  the causes which underlie phenomena. Furthermore, they both acknowledge that 
their philosophies have limits in accounting for phenomena, and admit that they cannot provide 
the ultimate causes of  the laws or principles they reveal in their causal background (see THN 
Abstract.1). They also both refuse to enter into empirically ungrounded speculations, i.e. ones 
that are not gained by the analysis of  phenomena. These are, however, superficial methodological 
similarities that would not give support to the idea of  a substantially Newtonian method in 
Hume. 
 Actually, if  one takes the Principia as the model of  Newtonian method, one should also 
conclude that Hume’s method is not Newtonian. In the first two books of  the Principia Newton’s 
axioms or laws of  motion are put forward as ‘inference-tickets’ allowing him to make inferences 
from motions to forces and conversely, and from macrophysical to microphysical forces.34 There 
are no such inference-tickets in Hume, no sign of  similar theoretical structure envisaged as an 
axiomatic Procrustean bed into which observed phenomena are forced.  The Principia fits nicely 
with the ancient axiomatic-mathematical tradition of  natural philosophy,35 it is essentially 
mathematical:36 it bases the principles of  natural philosophy on those of  mathematics, and 
successfully combines the mathematical tradition with the experimental approach. The success is 
due to the nature of  Newton’s project in the Principia, that is to calculate an unknown quantity 
from a set of  known parameters. This is why Newton’s axiomatic system makes experimental 
data suitable for algebraic treatment.37 
 This axiomatic-mathematical-quantifying outlook is entirely missing from Hume, and it is very 
hard to see how his work could be integrated with that at all. The principles Hume invokes in 
exploring human phenomena are not quantifiable. Perception, imagination, reason etc. are 
various faculties of  the mind whose interaction results in ideas and impressions causing 
behaviour, but their contribution can hardly be measured and the principles of  their interaction 
can hardly be quantified – not even in principle. So their relations cannot be represented in an 
algebraic way, in terms of  relations of  quantities either. Instead, they are qualitatively different 
                                                 
33 See Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings, edited by Andrew Janiak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004) 
87. 
34 See George E. Smith, ‘The Methodology of  the Principia’, in The Cambridge Companion to Newton, edited by I.B. 
Cohen and George E. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) 143. 
35 See Kuhn, op. cit., 41 and Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press 1995) 242. 
36 See I. Bernard Cohen, ‘The Case of  the Missing Author’, in Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy, edited by Jed Z. 
Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2001) 22f. 
37 See Márta Fehér, ‘The Method of  Analysis-Synthesis and the Structure of  Causal Explanation in Newton’, 
International Studies in the Philosophy of  Science 1 (1986): 60-84. 
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principles of  human nature, and the explanation of  human phenomena consists in a description 
of  how these principles with their distinctive characteristics figure in producing them. 
 The qualitative character of  Hume’s enterprise gives a clue as to which aspect of  Newton’s 
thought might shed light on Hume’s method. Arguably, there is a deeper analogy between his 
method and that of  Newton’s other major work, the Opticks [1704], namely that of  the method 
of  analysis and synthesis. And while the method itself  has ancient roots and in various forms it was 
a common currency of  early-modern methodological thinking,38 yet the way in which it was put 
to use by Newton was perceived as original,39 and it became dominant in eighteenth-century 
British natural philosophy through his Opticks.40 Hume’s above quoted commitment to this 
method is consonant with Newton’s methodological proclamation in Query 31, which I quote at 
length: 
in natural philosophy, the investigation of  difficult things by the method of  analysis, ought 
ever to precede the method of  composition. This analysis consists in making experiments and 
observations, and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction, and admitting of  
no objections against the conclusions, but such as are taken from experiments, or other certain 
truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental philosophy. And although the 
arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of  general 
conclusions; yet it is the best way of  arguing which the nature of  things admits of, and may be 
looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the induction is more general. And if  no 
exception occurs from phenomena, the conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if  at any 
time afterwards any exception shall occur from experiments, it may then begin to be 
pronounced with such exceptions as occur. By this way of  analysis we may proceed from 
compounds to ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing them; and in general, 
from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument 
end in the most general. This is the method of  analysis, and the synthesis consists in assuming 
the causes discovered, and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena 
proceeding from them, and proving the explanations.41 
 
As Newton himself  here points out, he uses this method in the first two books of  Opticks ‘to 
discover and prove the original differences of  rays of  light’, that is to discover qualitative 
differences. This is what the method of  analysis-synthesis, so understood, can reveal: causes 
belonging to different kinds. And while Newton applies this method in accounting for natural 
phenomena, he does not doubt that by doing so ‘the bounds of  moral philosophy will be also 
enlarged’.42 
 Newton seems to follow the same method in the Principia too: ‘the basic problem of  
                                                 
38 See Jardine, op. cit., 17ff. 
39 See Russell McCormmach, Speculative Truth: Henry Cavendish, Natural Philosophy, and the Rise of  Modern Theoretical 
Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) 38. 
40 See Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural Philosophy in an Age of  Reason (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1969) 10. and Deborah A. Redman, The Rise of  Political Economy as a Science: Methodology and 
the Classical Economists (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997), 107. 
41 Newton, op. cit., 139. 
42 Newton, op. cit., 140. 
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philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of  nature from the phenomena of  motions and 
then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces.’43 And while it is true that there he 
analyses motions into forces, he does so by relying on his ‘inference tickets’, thereby preserving 
the axiomatic character of  his analyses. Besides, his commitment to find forces behind motions 
prevents his inquiry from being qualitative, i.e. an analysis of  compounds into ingredients. His 
enterprise in the Principia is to search for a specific, quantifiable natural kind, i.e. forces, and not 
qualitatively different components. In the Opticks his method is analogical, he proceeds by the 
observation and comparison of  different rays of  light with respect to various properties like 
‘refrangibility, reflexibility, and colour, and their alternate fits of  easy reflexion and easy transmission’.44 
Different ways of  analysis-synthesis are thus applied in the two works, with different aims and in 
different methodological environments, and it is only that of  the Opticks that can be linked to 
Hume’s enterprise. 
 The skeleton of  this method is, however, common in both cases and can be summarised as 
follows:45 
1) Resolution of  phenomena into their causal components. 
2) Investigation into the components’ mutual dependence and interaction. 
3) Generalisation of  the relations so revealed to every similar phenomenon. 
4) Deployment of  the principles thus gained in the explanation and prediction of  phenomena. 
By contrast, the Cartesian method of  analysis is propositional:46 inquiry consists in analysing a 
complex question into simpler ones until intuitive answers can be given. Then comes synthesis in 
deducing explanations from these clear and distinct insights. Experiment plays only an auxiliary 
role here, either in helping us to choose how to proceed with our questions, or in checking the 
empirical adequacy of  our answers. This is thus neither an analysis of  ‘compounds to ingredients’ 
nor ‘motions to the forces producing them’, it is neither quantitative nor qualitative, but a 
predominantly a priori analysis of  complex propositions into intuitively simpler ones. 
 Descartes’s method cannot guide qualitative inquiry into the components of  human nature, 
but can be useful in hypothetical-normative constructions, inferring from the intuitively 
accessible properties of  human beings their desirable, rightful, necessary etc. social 
circumstances. Therefore it is hardly surprising that Hume does not follow the Cartesian way, but 
his comparative analysis and analogical reasoning fits rather well into the Newtonian framework: 
‘experiments’ should be ‘judiciously collected and compar’d’ (THN 6), and the principles 
underlying them should be revealed ‘from the observation of  several parallel instances’ (EHU 
                                                 
43 Newton, op. cit., 41. 
44 Newton, op. cit., 139. 
45 See Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes, The Method of  Analysis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1974) 110. 
46 See Garber, op. cit., 37. 
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8.13). Hume’s way of  using historical and everyday observations is therefore similar to Newton’s 
use of  experiment in the Opticks.47 Instead of  collecting hundreds of  cases in an inductivist 
Baconian or Boylean manner, they both proceed by comparing some phenomena, arriving at 
hypotheses by generalising the findings, in Hume’s words: ‘What I discover to be true in some 
instances, I suppose to be so in all’ (THN 2.1.5.1). And these are to be tested by carefully chosen 
experiments, or against seeming counterexamples, taken from history and everyday life or from a 
purposively created artificial setting. 
 This method connects natural and moral philosophy, and establishes them as continuous fields 
of  knowledge in which the nature and extent of  knowledge are the same. The difference between 
moral and natural philosophy consists in the subtlety of  phenomena, and not in the methods 
followed. The difference is thus merely that of  complexity and not in the nature of  inquiry; the 
method of  the moral and the natural philosopher are the same. This conviction, consonant again 
with Newton’s ideals as expressed in the Opticks, emerges clearly in the introduction of  Hume’s 
Treatise: 
the essence of  the mind being equally unknown to us with that of  external bodies, it must be 
equally impossible to form any notion of  its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful 
and exact experiments, and the observation of  those particular effects, which result from its 
different circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our 
principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining 
all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond 
experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of  
human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. (THN 
Introduction.8) 
 
This passage expresses belief  in the methodological continuity of  moral and natural philosophy; 
the emphasis on experiment; the aim to explore underlying causes (analysis) and explaining by 
them (synthesis); the denunciation of  experimentally ungrounded explanatory hypotheses 
concerning ultimate principles; and the conviction that the capacities of  human cognition are 
limited. All this sounds very Newtonian, but in a sense much closer to the spirit of  the Opticks, 
and especially its Queries, than to the Principia. 
 What I am suggesting here is not that Hume’s method is explicitly modelled on Newton’s 
Opticks. I would rather say that it fits well with post-Newtonian methods of  natural inquiry that 
became dominant in Scotland in the first half  of  the eighteenth century, and it is plausible to 
think about Hume’s method as being part of  this strand of  thought. For example, Hume’s 
method is quite similar to the methodological credo followed by William Cullen, a prominent 
member of  the Scottish intellectual establishment and Hume’s friend and physician, in his 
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influential chemical investigations. Cullen distinguishes between two kinds of  analysis.48 Analysis 
into integrant parts, i.e. a quantitative analysis into mereological proper parts, is the business of  the 
mechanical philosopher, who studies substances as aggregates composed of  homogeneous 
ingredients. Analysis into constituent parts, however, studies substances as mixtures, as being 
composed of  qualitatively different components whose combination results in qualitatively 
different substances. The proper domain of  this latter kind of  analysis is thought to be the range 
of  phenomena in which the mechanical approach cannot yield an explanation. And this is the 
analysis that gives the methodological key both to eighteenth-century philosophical chemistry in 
Scotland, and to Hume’s method of  studying human nature as well. 
 
V. Hume’s Qualitative Project in Context 
I think the overall lesson is clear. The inquiry Hume pursues is primarily qualitative: it provides a 
way of  identifying the causal components contributing to the production of  human phenomena, 
by outlining ‘the accurate anatomy of  human nature’ (THN 1.4.7.23). As it were, Hume offers a 
chemical analysis of  compound human nature into its ingredients. These are identified as 
principles with distinctive causal contribution, and human phenomena are considered to be the 
result of  their dynamic interaction. They provide the universal structure of  human nature in terms 
of  its functional components characterised by their self-activity, by the distinctive way they operate 
on ideas and impression. It is thus more than a mere figure of  speech when Hume says he 
explores the anatomy of  human nature – it is a central and constitutive metaphor of  his entire 
project.49 
 The analysis of  human phenomena results in various motives of  human behaviour and 
internal functioning, which are then subsumed under a variety of  principles ascribed to faculties 
of  the mind – like that of  sympathy, imagination, reason etc. The interaction of  these principles 
are frequently envisaged as the interaction of  qualitatively different principles, ‘as in certain 
chemical preparations, where the mixture of  two clear and transparent liquids produces a third, 
which is opaque and colour’d’ (THN 2.3.10.9). Rarely are they seen as qualitatively uniform 
Newtonian external forces, an artificial kind with specific direction and quantity. The Humean 
science of  human nature consists in the separation and identification of  these principles and the 
examination of  their interactions – in qualitative investigations that is, for which the method of  
analysis and synthesis is the ideal framework. 
 With his qualitative project Hume does not stand alone on the eighteenth-century intellectual 
                                                 
48 See A.L. Donovan, Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Doctrines and Discoveries of  William Cullen and 
Joseph Black (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1975) 96ff. 
49 See also THN 3.3.6.6 and Letters of  David Hume, op. cit., 32f. 
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landscape. As Robert Schofield points out, an important transformation in British intellectual 
climate took place around 1740, marking, among other developments, the emergence of  a 
materialistic-vitalistic tendency in natural inquiry, gradually replacing the Newtonian dynamic 
mechanism. As a result, a new style of  inquiry and explanation became common: ‘the 
mathematical analysis of  motions to find forces’ gave way to the exploration of  ‘different 
qualities from experimentally observed characteristics’.50 The new style of  explanation proceeded 
in terms of  qualitatively different substances, instead of  explaining phenomena in a mechanist 
way, in terms of  the interaction of  qualitatively homogenous particles. Newton’s aetherial 
speculations helped re-establish active principles as means of  explanation, and weakened the 
mechanist orthodoxy of  inertia being an essential property of  matter. This process had been 
initiated by the Opticks, and especially its Queries, and it had a very strong presence at Scottish 
universities throughout the century. Representatives of  it include William Cullen, Joseph Black, 
James Hutton, and John Gregory.51 
 These tendencies toward new styles of  explanation and inquiry were not peculiarly British 
phenomena. Discontent with mechanical philosophies of  nature was widespread in eighteenth-
century Europe, particularly in France and Germany. As Peter Hanns Reill shows, there was a 
vitalistic movement in the Enlightenment which responded to problems, particularly those of  
living matter, that mathematized mechanical theories could not solve. This led to a revival of  
natural history, most importantly represented by Buffon – and in the domain of  moral 
phenomena, by the Scottish Enlightenment. Its methods were not based on mathematics, but ‘on 
the principles of  comparison, resemblance, affinity, analogical reasoning’; its explanations in 
terms of  ‘inner, active forces as central agents in nature’ replaced the mechanists’ view of  
external forces acting on inert matter.52 It is important to note, however, that despite the 
emphasis on Baconian roots, natural history now aspired to more than Bacon had originally 
envisaged. It aimed not only at collecting, describing and classifying phenomena for future 
philosophical processing, but made instant explanatory use of  the insights gained by historical 
methods. The methods of  natural philosophy and natural history started to merge here. 
 This is the context, I believe, within which sense can be made of  Hume’s method. Recently, 
Andrew Cunningham suggested that a vitalistic outlook is characteristic of  Hume’s theory of  the 
mind whose essential feature is self-activity.53 I think it is fundamentally on the right track and is 
in accordance with Hume’s experimental method: it is qualitatively oriented, and as such it is ideal 
                                                 
50 Schofield, op. cit., 95. 
51 See Schofield, op. cit, 10f  and 91ff. 
52 Reill, op. cit., 69, see also Wood, op. cit. 
53 Andrew Cunningham, ‘Hume’s Vitalism and Its Implications.’ British Journal for the History of  Philosophy 15 (2007): 
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for revealing the distinctive contribution various faculties make. They exert active influence by 
transforming the passive material of  impressions and ideas: sympathy turns ideas into 
impressions thus enabling us to feel what others feel (THN 2.1.11.3); upon experiencing one 
event regularly following another habit provides us with a secondary impression as the basis of  
our idea of  necessary connection (THN 1.3.14.16ff), and so on. Human nature is composed of  
functional components characterised by their active contribution in terms of  predominantly non-
mechanical principles. The science of  man is the enterprise of  charting them and their 
interactions. 
 However, one should not overlook Hume’s occasional inclinations towards mechanistic 
explanations that, despite the general vitalistic thrust, are still very much present. This 
mechanistic outlook shows up in the discussion of  the principles of  association which Hume 
describes as forces of  attraction (THN 1.1.4.6). The mechanistic-vitalistic Janus face of  Hume’s 
account sometimes manifests itself  clearly: 
Ideas never admit of  a total union, but are endow’d with a kind of  impenetrability, by which 
they exclude each other, and are capable of  forming a compound by their conjunction, not by 
their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of  an entire union; 
and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of  them may lose itself, and 
contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. (THN 2.2.6.1) 
 
Here it seems that ideas are subject to the dynamic-mechanical principles of  association, but 
impressions and passions seem to interact more like chemical elements. Elsewhere he talks about 
the ‘impulses or directions’ of  certain impressions or passions (THN 2.2.9.2), which seem to be 
more of  a mechanistic outlook on impressions; and also about the product of  sympathy as ‘an 
idea converted into an impression’ (THN 2.2.9.13), which sounds more like a chemical 
transformation. Similar passages indicate that the question of  vitalism contra mechanism is not 
unequivocally settled in Hume. The general picture seems to be this: his project and method are 
qualitative and vitalistic, but his inquiry reveals certain components of  human nature whose 
functioning are best explained in mechanistic ways. 
 Trying to combine the two styles is not unique in the period. One could argue that Hume – 
like Bryan Robinson, who made an important contribution to the acceptance of  the aether 
hypothesis among eighteenth-century experimental philosophers – combined corpuscular and 
aethereal explanations, possibly even without noticing their difference.54 It is more probable, 
however, that Hume’s strategy, like that of  Buffon and Cullen, is to retain those aspects of  the 
mechanical approach that can be fitted with an overall vitalistic framework.55 He does not reject 
mechanism altogether, but speaks a chemical and vitalistic language when it serves his purposes 
                                                 
54 See Schofield, op. cit., 109. 
55 See Reill, op. cit., 67ff  and Donovan, op. cit., 96f. 
Hume’s Experimental Method 21 
better, or when he cannot do otherwise. And in general it seems that for Hume the language of  
qualitatively different active principles suits for an account of  human nature much better than the 
language of  external forces acting on inherently inert homogenous matter.56 
 
                                                 
56 I am indebted for helpful comments and discussion to David Bloor, Márta Fehér, Giora Hon, Brad Hume, Ruth 
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